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Abstract
Microprudential capital requirements are designed to reduce the excessive
risk taking of banks. If banks are required to use more equity funding for
risky assets they invest more funds into safe assets. This paper analyzes a
government that simultaneously regulates the banking sector and borrows
from it. I argue that a government may have the incentive to use capital
requirements to alleviate its budget burden. The risk weights for risky assets
may be placed relatively too high compared to the risk weight on government
bonds. This could have a negative impact on welfare. The supply of loans
for the risky sector shrinks, which may have a negative impact on long term
growth. Moreover, the government may be tempted to increase its debt level
due to better funding conditions, which increases the risk of a future sovereign
debt crisis. A short term focused government may be tempted to neglect the
risk and, thereby, may introduce systemic risk in the banking sector.
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1. Introduction
The recent financial crisis and the resulting economic crises have illus-
trated the vulnerability of the banking sector and its negative externalities
on real sector development. One main cause of the vulnerability of the bank-
ing sector is that banks are partly shielded against the downside risk of their
investments by explicit insurance of their deposit liabilities and implicit in-
surance in the form of government support. The main instrument that is
used to prevent banks from taking excessive risk is risk sensitive capital re-
quirement regulation. Optimal regulation reduces the risk shifting of banks
and can implement the optimal risk allocation. However, a government may
face an inherent conflict of interest when setting the risk weights for bank
assets. On the one hand, governments regulate banks to limit their expo-
sure to risk and the related negative externalities of such risk. On the other
hand, banks are also a source of financing government debt as pointed out
by Calomiris and Haber (2011).
This paper analyzes the inherent conflict of interest and the possible im-
plications for optimal capital requirement regulation and discusses possible
welfare implications. Based on a simple model, it is shown that a govern-
ment which simultaneously regulates the banks and borrows from them, may
have the incentive to overregulate risky investments compared to safe invest-
ments if those safe investments are government bonds. The interesting point
made here is that the government can influence its budget indirectly via risk
weighted capital regulation and, thus, may circumvent the monetary policy
monopoly of the central bank. This calls into question whether or not gov-
ernments should be entitled with setting the optimal risk weights for capital
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requirement regulation.
If government bonds are indeed safe, the overregulation of risky assets
may not decrease overall welfare. However, if the risk of government default
increases due to its indebtedness, a limitedly liable government can have the
incentive to neglect this risk partially, participating in risk shifting on its own.
This might result in increased systemic risk and a vulnerable government,
with detrimental effects on welfare.
The idea that the financial sector is a potential source of easy resources
for a government to finance its debt has been already discussed by McKinnon
(1973). He defines financial repression as a set of policies, laws, regulation,
taxes, distortions, qualitative and quantitative restrictions, and controls that
are imposed by governments, which do not allow financial intermediaries to
be active at their full technological potential. This point abstracts from the
optimal degree of regulation in banking that is justified by the existence
of moral hazard and other market failures. Financial repression considers
any policy that goes beyond the regulation that deals with the negative
externalities of financial markets. Roubini and Sala-i Martin (1992) conclude
that regulation in the form of financial repression tends to reduce financial
intermediation from its optimal level, and thereby has negative effects on the
long term growth of the economy.
However, to the author’s knowledge, the government’s incentives for a
biased setting of risk weights in capital requirements has not yet been dis-
cussed, and it is the goal of this paper to close this gap.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, strengthening capital requirement
regulation became the major concern of regulators. The goal of recent reg-
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ulatory reforms, such as the third Basel Accord, is to increase the quantity
and the quality of the equity base, which banks use to refund their invest-
ments. However, the discussion of the risk weights for bank assets has been
of limited concern.
The impact of banking capital regulation on the portfolio composition
of banks is well studied. The Basel I accord was criticized for applying too
broad risk weights among assets. By searching for yield, the banks have the
incentive to reshuffle their portfolios to the highest risk assets with accord-
ingly higher returns within one risk class. The Basel II and III changes and
enhancements aim to reduce this regulatory arbitrage. The broad risk classes
for capital requirements were amended according to external ratings under
the standard approach. As in Basel II, the Basel III agreement sets a zero
risk weight to AAA-AA- rated governments while loan assets require a sig-
nificantly higher risk weight. Moreover, the new Basel accord expects large
and sophisticated banks to implement the IRB approach, which requires an
individual assessment of government risk. However, the recommendations of
the Basel agreements are not binding for national government regulators. In
fact, when the European Union implemented the Basel II approach in the
form of the Capital Requirement Directive1, a zero risk weight for sovereign
bonds of the European Union members, regardless of their risk rating, was
sustained under the standardized approach.2
1Basel II was implemented into European law by DIRECTIVE 2006/48/EC, Article
89(1)(d), which was amended by the Directive 2009/111/EC. The zero risk weight excep-
tion for Member States is still valid.
2“Exposures to Member States’ central governments and central banks denominated
and funded in the domestic currency of that central government and central bank shall be
assigned a risk weight of 0 %.” (Directive 2006/48/EC, Annex VI, Part1(4))
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Moreover, the European directive allows for the IRB approach the perma-
nent partial use rules, according to which, the IRB approach can be applied
to corporate exposures, whereas the risk weight applied to the member state
government exposures remains zero.3
The comparatively low risk weight for government bonds can certainly be
justified with very low observed government defaults. However, the recent
government debt crisis and the continuous deterioration of government risk
ratings casts doubts on this certainty. This reluctancy to implement the risk
sensitive amendments made by the Basel II approach may serve as anecdotal
evidence of the tendency to privilege government bonds. This biased regula-
tion had a detrimental effect in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Jablecki
(2012, p.6) summarizes this effect as follows “[...] by imposing a zero risk
weight on all EU sovereign exposures - irrespective of the governments’ fiscal
conditions’ - the CRD [Capital Requirement Directive] encouraged banks to
load up on debt issued by the most risky euro-area governments, reducing the
yields that these governments would have had to pay creditors otherwise”.
Brunnermeier et al. (2011) present a detailed discussion on how the over-
investment of banks in government debt has created a “vicious circle” in
which a doubt on the government’s safety creates a crisis in those banks’
safety which have invested heavily in government bonds. The stressed banks
in turn need to be supported by the government, which increases government
debt further eroding the government’s solvency.
Both effects have been supported with empirical evidence. Reinhart and
3The EU-wide Stress Test Aggregate Report of the European Banking Authority (2011)
revealed that only 36 out of 90 banks applied the IRB approach to sovereign debt.
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Rogoff (2011) find empirical evidence that a systemic banking crisis increases
the probability of a subsequent government debt crisis. Borensztein and
Panizza (2009) find support that the occurrence of a sovereign debt crisis
increases the probability of a banking crisis.
Observing this diabolic loop in the current sovereign debt crisis, the ques-
tion arises: Why does a regulator have the incentive to indirectly subsidize
government debt with unbalanced relative risk weights for capital require-
ment regulation?
Livshits and Schoors (2009) present a simple model and some empirical
evidence of a Russian data set that a government may not have the right
incentive to include sovereign risk in prudential regulation as this could lower
the cost of financing the debt and may postpone the sovereign default.
In contrast, this paper argues that a regulator may have an incentive to
increase the relative risk weight for risky assets beyond the optimal point if
the government does is not prone to default risk.
The goal of a financial regulator without any fiscal interest is modeled as
in Tirole (1994), according to which the regulator represents the interest of
the depositors and intervenes in the case of a banker’s insolvency by guar-
anteeing outstanding debt to depositors in exchange for control rights of the
bank. This view leads to a narrow goal of the regulator, who is not concerned
with maximizing social welfare but is, instead, interested in minimizing the
negative externality of banks’ excessive risk taking.
Moreover, in contrast to the narrow goal of the regulator, this paper
also allows the government regulator to pursue the additional goal of current
budget maximization. This is a very simplified approach to a government’s
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objective, but it is commonly used in public choice theory.4 Introducing
a more sophisticated objective function of the government, would however,
not change the basic results as long as the government has an incentive
to increase its debt above the level that would result from microprudential
regulation. By setting excessively high risk weights on risky assets, such as
loans to entrepreneurs, banks’ funds are channeled into safe assets, such as
government bonds. Assuming that equity funding is costly to the banker a
higher risk weight on assets increases the marginal costs and thereby channels
more funds into less weighted assets. Hence, for a given market size and funds
available, higher risk weights for risky assets create higher demand for low
risk assets.
The paper proceeds as follows: in chapter two, a simple model of banker’s
risk shifting is introduced and it is shown how an optimal capital requirement
for risky assets can reduce or eliminate this risk shifting. By extending the
objective function of the regulator for short term consumption, the regulator
with fiscal interests is introduced and his regulatory choice is compared with
the optimal regulation. In chapter 3, the welfare implications are briefly
discussed. Chapter 4 concludes.
4The argument goes back to Niskanen (1971) who introduces a model in which politi-
cians’ preferences are directly linked to an increase in their bureau’s budget. The budget
maximizer as one extreme and also the mixed incentives of a government are commonly
used in the analysis of public choice e.g. Haucap and Kirstein (2003) discuss four types
of a government: a welfare maximizer, a Leviathan that is only interested in budget max-
imization, an industry friendly government and a green government in order to analyze
the optimal pricing of pollution permits. The two latter types of governments have mixed
incentives of the two extremes. I follow their approach by discussing the extreme case of
a not fiscally interested and a fully interested government, a Leviathan, and any mixed
incentives in between the two cases.
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2. The Model
Consider an economy with two dates t = 1, 2. Agents make their decisions
at t = 1 and returns are realized at t = 2. The economy is populated with four
different types of agents: bankers, households, borrowers, and a government
regulator.
2.1. The Bankers
There is a continuum of bank owner-managers5 , normalized to one, which
are risk neutral and receive an endowment W = 1 in t = 0.
I assume that bank owner-managers, which I call from here on simply
bankers, have the unique skill to profitably provide loans L to borrowers.
The assumption that only bankers are able to profitably provide loans to
borrowers reflects the incomplete market paradigm for financial markets. In
particular, I assume that the loan market is segmented such that risky bor-
rowers cannot borrow directly from households. This market friction consti-
tutes one of the raison d’eˆtre for banks.6 Due to their unique skills to screen
and monitor borrowers, banks facilitate access to funding to profitable in-
vestment projects that could not be carried out otherwise because borrowers
lack access to financial markets.7 However, to keep the model simple, the
5The bank owner-manager may also reflect a consortium of a mass of shareholders and
a delegated manager if the manager’s interests are aligned with the shareholders and there
is no conflict of interest among shareholders.
6Freixas and Rochet (2008) offer a comprehensive overview on the incomplete market
paradigm for financial markets. They argue that banks play an important role in im-
proving the efficient allocation of capital by: 1) Offering liquidity and payment services,
2) transforming assets, 3) managing risks, and 4) processing information and monitoring
borrowers (Freixas and Rochet, 2008, p.2).
7This is a simplification, since established firms with a good reputation and collateral
obviously have access to direct financial market funding. A vast literature deals with the
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costly monitoring and screening effort by banks that is necessary for loans
to be profitable is not explicitly modeled.
In order to invest in loan assets, banks can attract insured deposits from
households at a risk insensitive deposit rate rD. Moreover, I assume that
there is a deposit insurance risk premium, that is fixed and normalized to
zero. For brevity, I define RD = 1+rD to be the gross repayment on deposits.
Since depositors are insured, the deposit repayment is not contingent on the
riskiness of a bankers investment, and deposits take the form of a simple debt
contract. Combined with the deposit insurance, the simple debt contract
structure creates incentives for excessive risk taking, since banks are at least
partly shielded from the downside risk of their risky investments.8
Bank owners are assumed to maximize their consumption over the two
periods. In order to introduce a private cost of equity capital to the banker
I assume that in contrast to households the owners are impatient, i.e. they
discount their consumption at t = 2 with a discount factor 1/ρ where I
assume that ρ > RS, with RS = 1 + rS the gross repayment on safe assets,
i.e., government bonds. The factor ρ, thereby may be interpreted as ρ = 1+i
with i being the individual discount rate. The assumption ρ > RS thus
implies that i ≥ rS, the banker’s individual discount rate is higher than the
reasons for the coexistence of market and bank debt. For a good overview, see Freixas
and Rochet (2008). Most prominent is the discussion of the role of banks as delegated
monitors that screen borrowers as discussed by Broecker (1990), prevent Moral Hazard
as most prominently discussed by Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997), and are able to punish
borrowers as discussed e.g. by Diamond (1984). For simplicity, this paper neglects the
coexistence of market and bank debt and only focuses on firms that lack access to financial
markets.
8As Merton (1974) pointed out, deposit insurance creates an option value that banks
can exploit by risk shifting.
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safe interest rate on government bonds.9 The assumption reflects the idea
of the CAP-Model that the return on an assets increases with the riskiness
compared to the market risk. However, while the CAPM is based on the
assumption of risk-averse investors, this simple model includes a premium
on equity based on impatience in consumption. Therefore, the risk-neutral
banker behaves as if he was risk-averse and the investment of equity in the
risky bank is privately costly to the banker but not to the society. Moreover,
as shown later, debt financing is partly subsidized by a deposit insurance, and
thus inside equity funding is comparably more costly to the banker, because
depositors do not require to be compensated for the risk of default of the
bank.
To keep the model simple, I assume that banks have a constrained capac-
ity to invest. In particular, I assume that a bank’s optimal balance sheet size
is fixed and normalized to unity.10 Denote with x the proportion a banker
invests into safe assets and with 1− x the proportion of investment in risky
9A government could also be allowed to go bankrupt. In this case, also the deposits
become risky, since in case of government default, depositors receive nothing. However,
deposits remain the least risky investment with the same risk of default as the ”safe”
investment which is the government bond as they are both repaid as long as the government
is solvent.
10Consider otherwise, that banks can also choose the optimal balance sheet size. Since
we will consider decreasing returns to investments in risky assets, the balance sheet size
itself is a function of the banker’s optimal investment decision. To see this, consider assume
that the management of a bank yields a convex cost function of the bank’s balance sheet
size S, i.e., C(S) = S
2
θ2 . A single banker chooses the proportion of investments in safe
assets x and the balance sheet size. With decreasing returns to the investment in risky
loans, the return of investments is a function of x. Denote the utility of the banker as
U = p(R(x))S−C(S), then the optimal balance sheet size is determined by S = θp(R(x)).
This would considerably complicate the analysis without changing the main implications
that are sought to be analyzed. Since this paper does not aim at discussing the optimal
size of banks, the balance sheet size is, therefore, assumed to be exogenous.
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loan assets.
2.2. The Households
Furthermore, consider a continuum of households, normalized to one,
also with an endowment of W = 1 at the beginning of t = 1. Households are
assumed to be risk-neutral and maximize their consumption at date t = 2.11
The assumption that households cannot consume in t = 1 is a simple way
to create the need to safe money. Due to a lack of monitoring and screening
skills, households can not directly invest their endowment in risky assets.
In order to be able to consume in t = 2 households, thus, either invest
their endowments in government bonds or as insured deposits. Because all
banks together may, at the maximum, borrow an aggregate amount of 1 from
households in the form of deposits, and the depositors aggregate endowment
is W = 1, the depositors have no market power and will be willing to deposit
their endowment at the bank as long as RD ≥ RS since both assets have
the same risk, i.e., are safe assets in the basic setting. However, as discussed
later, the government overtakes the outstanding debt of a banker in case of
banker’s insolvency and therefore insures the deposits. As a result, even if
the government is not safe, deposits have the same risk level as government
bonds. Assuming that the households will provide the maximum endowment
possible to banks if RD = RS, it becomes clear, that banks will have to pay
R := RD = RS to the depositors in order to raise deposits.
12
11This assumption abstracts from the usual liquidity insurance problem of depositors.
However, with a known proportion of impatient and patient households, the result would
remain unchanged.
12The assumption of households preference for deposits is an epsilon argument, i.e., if
they are indifferent, banks only need to pay an  more than government bonds. However,
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2.3. The Borrowers
There is a continuum of penniless borrowers that receive loans L from
the banker, which they invest into a project that returns B with a posi-
tive probability p, and zero otherwise. I assume that the projects to which
borrowers have access are profitable, i.e., I assume that p · B > ρ. Intu-
itively, the expected gross return from risky projects is assumed to be higher
than the private opportunity cost of bankers to invest in those returns. The
investment in risky projects is therefore socially desirable.
The returns of investment projects are assumed to be perfectly uncor-
related. Due to a lack of collateral and transparency, borrowers can not
get direct funding from households but need to apply for loans from spe-
cialized banks. The bank loan is a simple debt contract that limits the
liability of the borrower, therefore, the banker receives the repayment on
the loan RL only in case of success.
13 The profit from an investment in
the borrower’s risky project is the expected net return minus a cost func-
tion that is convex in the loan amount, i.e., the investment in the risky
project. In particular, I assume the explicit form of the cost function to
be d
2
L2. Therefore, I can write the expected profit of a risky project as
ΠF = p
(
(B −RL)L− d2 · L2
)
+ (1 − p) (−d
2
L2
)
. The loan repayment is de-
creasing in aggregated investment, i.e., the indirect loan demand is assumed
to be a decreasing function of overall investment. To understand the intu-
ition, consider a representative penniless borrower, who faces the following
the preference can also be motivated by liquidity and service arguments such as access to
ATM and electronic payment systems.
13Again, RL = 1 + rL is for brevity the gross repayment which consists of the loan
interest rate rL plus one.
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utility function:
UF (L) = max{ΠF ; 0} · (1− τ) (1)
In case of success, the borrower makes a profit of which he has to pay a
tax τ to the government. In order to maximize its utility, the representative
borrower demands a loan amount L∗ = argmax UF (L). Because he is limited
liable, the utility of a penniless borrower can only be non-negative, a strictly
positive demand for loans exists for small loan repayments. In particular, the
first partial derivative with respect to L is either negative, such that L∗ = 0
or the optimal loan demand derived from the first order condition is given by
L∗ = B−RL
d
. The optimal loan demand is decreasing in the loan repayment.
Considering that each banker invests a total amount of 1 into assets, such
that x is the amount the banker invests in government bonds, and L = 1−x
is the share that is invested into risky loans. Therefore, the indirect demand
function for bank loans can be written as
RL = B − d(1− x) (2)
Here, B can be interpreted as the reservation price, the maximum loan in-
terest payment borrowers are able to pay. In particular, strategic interaction
among banks is neglected because it would not change the general result of
this model.
2.4. The Government Regulator
In regulating the bankers, the government regulator that has no fiscal in-
terest has the goal of reducing the excessive risk taking of banks via adequate
risk weighted capital requirements. The regulator aims at internalizing the
negative externalities of the deposit insurance without aiming at maximizing
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overall welfare. The idea is, that when the banker does not bear the full cost
of funding its investment due to the deposit insurance on deposit funding, he
will invest too much of his funds into risky loans. In particular, the unreg-
ulated limitedly liable banker will invest more in risky loans than he would
if he was fully liable for his outstanding debt. In particular, the investment
in safe assets of a fully liable bank x∗ is greater than the investment of a
limitedly liable bank x∗ > xˆ. As in the real world, the regulator can not
directly regulate the asset portfolio composition of a banker’s investment,
which would be the first best solution. This could be justified by a lack of
information on the specific asset characteristics, that is only known by the
banker.
However, the regulator can indirectly influence the portfolio composition
by setting regulating the liability side of the bank’s balance sheet. In order
to do so, the regulator forces the bankers to refund a share of their risky
investments with privately costly equity, i.e., he puts a relative risk weighted
capital requirement Δ on risky loan assets. The relative risk weight Δ makes
investments into risky loans relatively more costly to the banker than invest-
ments in safe government bonds, and therefore decreases the investment in
risky assets and increases the investments in safe assets. In other words, the
banker’s investment in safe assets xˆ(Δ) is an increasing function of the rela-
tive risk weight Δ∗. In this way, the regulator can force the banker to invest
exactly the same amount of funds into risky assets as the banker would invest
when he was fully liable, i.e., first best investment amount. In order to force
banks to internalize the cost of their risk shifting, the regulator implements
the risk weighted capital requirement for risky assets that disciplines banks
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to behave as if they were fully liable such that xˆ(Δ∗) = x∗
However, as discussed above, the government regulator also borrows from
the banks, which can influence his optimal decisions. Therefore, it is assumed
that the government has no endowments in t = 1 but receives tax income
τ · UF in t = 2 from successful borrowers.
In order to be able to repay current debt and provide public goods as
well as bailing out the liabilities of defaulted banks, the government issues
government bonds as safe assets in t = 1 with the promise of a fixed gross
repayment of RS in t = 2. In order to guarantee interior solutions, I assume
that p · (B − d) < RS. This assumption implies that due to the increasing
cost of conducting risky projects, i.e., the decreasing returns from risky in-
vestments, the gross return from risky investments if all funds are channeled
into it is lower than the return on safe investments. In other words, it is
socially not optimal to invest all funds into the risky projects of borrowers.
Moreover, this implies that p · (B − d) < ρ: it is not optimal to invest the
aggregate banker’s endowment into risky assets. Together with the earlier
assumption of profitable initial investments p · B > ρ the assumption above
secures that it is neither optimal to invest all funds in safe nor risky assets,
but in a portfolio of both assets.
The government’s objective when borrowing is to maximize its budget,
which is reflected as the objective to maximize current consumption. De-
pending on the focus of the government regulator, the goal of budget max-
imization enters the regulator’s objective function with weighting factor φ
measuring the fiscal interest of a government regulator. In the basic model,
it is assumed that government bonds are indeed safe, i.e. that the govern-
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ment regulator receives an endowment in t = 2 that enables him to pay back
the bond obligations.
2.5. Decisions and Timing
The timing is as follows: the households and bankers receive their initial
endowments and the regulator decides on the optimal relative risk weight for
risky assets compared to safe assets Δ as a minimum capital requirement
regulation. After the agents received their endowments, the bankers collect
funds from depositors, decide to invest inside equity, invest deposits and
equity into assets, and consume the residual in t = 1. In t = 2, the bankers
receive the returns from their successful asset investments. If they are solvent,
they repay their debt to depositors and consume any profits. If insolvent, the
bank is closed and the banker’s outstanding debt is cleared by the deposit
insurance, which is covered the government in this model. Because the banker
consumes the part of his endowment, which he does not invest as equity, he
is penniless in t = 2 and, thus, also limitedly liable. In case of bank default,
the banker receives a payoff of zero, while equity that was invested in t = 1
is sunk.
Figure 1: The Timeline of the Decisions Taken
  
t=0 t=1 t=2
Regulator sets
risk weight Δ.
Agents receive
initial endowments.
Knowing Δ,
banks choose
equity K, invest
safe xˆ(Δ)and risky
(1− xˆ(Δ)) assets.
Returns are realized.
Banks are closed if insolvent.
Governments are replaced
if insolvent.
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3. The Banker’s Investment Decision
3.1. The First Best Investment
As a benchmark, I first discuss the optimal investment choice of bankers
in the absence of externalities and without regulation. Therefore, consider
a world, where a banker is fully liable. After receiving his endowment in
t = 1, the representative banker has to decide how much to invest of its
own endowment as inside equity investment K. The banker borrows the
residual 1−K as deposits from households at the promised repayment RD.
He then invests the deposits and own equity in a portfolio of a share x of safe
government bonds with repayment RS and in a share (1 − x) of loan asset
with repayment RL(x). In the benchmark, the banker is fully liable to repay
the deposit liability even if his asset investments default.
The banker then chooses K, and respectively D = 1 −K and the asset
portfolio composition x to maximize his expected intertemporal consump-
tion. As he is impatient he discounts the expected future consumption in
time t = 2.
E(U fl(K, x)) = c1 +
1
ρ
· E(c2) (3)
s.t.
c1 = W −K
E(c2) = p (xRS + (1− x)RL(x)− (1−K)RD) + (1− p) (RSx− (1−K)RD)
Because of the full liability, the consumption of the banker can be negative
in t = 2. In particular, it will be negative when the bank invests no own
equity as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If the risky loan investment defaults, the banker’s consumption
c2 is negative when he proportion of equity investment is smaller than the
17
investment in risky assets.
Proof. With probability (1 − p), the loan asset investment defaults and the
banker receives (RSx− (1−K)RD). As discussed above, the deposit rate
is driven down to R = RD = RS, which implies R(x − 1 − K) such that
consumption becomes negative whenever 1− x > K.
This follows from the zero profit of the safe investment, which does not
create a buffer against losses. The partial derivative of the expected future
consumption with respect to equity investment K is:
∂E(U fl)
∂K
= −1 + 1
ρ
·RD (4)
As discussed above, the deposit rate is driven down to R = RD = RS. Under
the assumption that ρ > RS the right hand side of equation (4) is negative,
such that even a fully liable banker chooses to leverage his portfolio with
deposits as much as possible.
Lemma 2. A fully liable banker invests no inside equity but all deposits into
a portfolio with (1− x∗) = B−
R
p
2d
risky loan assets and x∗ government bonds.
Proof. Because ∂E(U
fl)
∂K
< 0 the banker optimally chooses to invest no inside
equity. With K = 0 the partial derivative of the expected consumption
function with respect to x becomes:
∂E(U fl)
∂x
= p(R−RL(x) + (1− x)R′L(x)) + (1− p)R != 0.
Solving the first order condition for the optimal investment into risky loan
assets 1− x∗ yields (1− x∗) = B−
R
p
2d
Intuitively, the optimal portfolio decision equalizes the marginal profit
of the safe investment, which is zero, with the marginal profits of the risky
investment.
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I now introduce the economic problem that the banker is only limitedly
liable, i.e., after he consumed his initial endowment, he cannot made liable
if the asset returns from his investment portfolio fall short of his liabilities to
depositors. In other words, from now on, I exclude the possibility of negative
consumption.
3.2. The Banker’s Investment Decision without Regulation
If the banker is limitedly liable, his future consumption can be at min-
imum zero. He therefore wants to maximize the following expected utility
function.
E(U ltd(K, x)) = c1 +
1
ρ
· E(c2) (5)
s.t.
c1 = W −K
E(c2) = max{p (xRS + (1− x)RL(x)− (1−K)RD)
+(1− p) (RSx− (1−K)RD) ; 0}
Lemma 3. The unregulated banker prefers to consume all his endowments
in t = 1 and borrow D = 1 from insured depositors.
Proof. The right hand side of first order partial derivative with respect to
inside equity investments is negative in each case, i.e., ∂E(U
ltd)
∂K
= −1 < 0
if E(c2) = 0 and
∂E(U ltd)
∂K
= −1 + 1
ρ
· RD < 0, otherwise. Therefore, the
unregulated bank will always prefer to consume all its endowments in t =
1.
With K = 0, the profit from bank investment is never positive, if the
loan investment fails. Therefore, the first order condition with respect to the
optimal portfolio choice variable x becomes
∂E(U ltd)
∂x
=
1
ρ
· p [R−RL(x) + (1− x)R′L(x)] != 0 (6)
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The marginal benefit from investing in the loan asset should equal the marginal
benefit from investing in the safe asset, which is zero. Using the linear indi-
rect demand function, the optimal investment of an unregulated bank into
risky assets is
(1− xˆ) = B −R
2d
(7)
Lemma 4. A Limitedly liable banker takes excessive risk in the form of
higher loan asset investments compared to optimal investment with full lia-
bility.
Proof. Consider from Lemma 2 the optimal investment of a fully liable bank:
(1− x∗) = 1
2
B−R
p
d
. For any positive default probability of risky assets p < 1,
it holds that R
p
> R such that (1 − x∗) < (1 − xˆ) or x∗ > xˆ a fully liable
banker invests more funds into safe assets and less into risky assets.
3.3. The Banker’s Investment Decision with Regulation
A risk weighted capital requirement in this model is reflected by a relative
risk weight for risky loans compared to safe loans: K ≥ (1 − x) · Δ. The
relative risk weight Δ ∈ [0, 1] is a stark simplification of the granulated
capital requirements of the Basel II and III accords but covers in essence the
main mechanisms of the influence of risk weights on the portfolio choice of
bankers.
A more realistic approach to Basel II would be a capital requirement
K ≥ (wS · x + wL(1 − x))δ, where δ is the unweighted percentage, i.e, 8 %
of assets under Basel II, wS is the risk weight for safe assets and wL is the
risk weight for risky assets. A zero risk weight for safe assets immediately
results in wL · δ, which corresponds to the Δ in the simplified approach.
With a nonzero risk weight for safe assets the requirement can be written as
K ≥ (wS · δ+(wL−wS)δ(1−x)). In this case, the optimal portfolio decision
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of the banker will not only be influenced by the overall size of the capital
requirement but also by the relative risk weight, i.e., the decision is influenced
by (wL − wS)δ. This relative risk weight is also captured by the simplified
Δ above. If the Δ corresponds to the relative risk weight (wL − wS)δ it is
noteworthy that Δ can be increased by a higher risk weight for risky assets
as well as by a lower risk weight for safe assets, respectively. This implies
that a correct risk weight for risky loan assets but a comparatively too low
risk weight for the safer asset, such as government bonds, is also reflected in
a higher Δ.
The inside equity investment of the banker must at least equal a per-
centage Δ of its risky loan investment. As discussed above, a banker prefers
consumption over investing inside equity, hence, the minimum equity re-
quirement that the regulator sets will be a binding constraint to the bankers
optimal investment decision K = (1− x) ·Δ. Inserting the binding require-
ment into equation (5) yields the regulated banker’s objective function.
E(U reg(x)) = c1 +
1
ρ
· E(c2) (8)
s.t.
c1 = W − (1− x) ·Δ
E(c2) = max{p (xRS + (1− x)RL(x)− (1− (1− x) ·Δ)RD)
+(1− p) (RSx− (1−K)RD) ; 0}
Lemma 5. For a relative risk weighted capital requirement Δ < 1, the regu-
lated banker does not make positive profits when his assets default.
Proof. Recall from Lemma 1 that a banker defaults when his assets default
whenever (1 − x) > K. Substitution of the binding relative risk weighted
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capital requirement K = (1 − x) · Δ gives (1 − x) > (1 − x) · Δ, such that
the banker defaults whenever Δ < 1.
In the case of Δ = 1, the banker is forced to refund 100% of his assets
with equity, such that he cannot default. However, this extreme regulation
implies that the banker looses his role as a financial intermediary and is
therefore excluded from the analysis.14
Lemma 5 shows that a regulated limited liable banker, i.e., a banker
that is regulated with Δ < 1 expects future consumption to be E(c2) =
p (xRS + (1− x)RL(x)− (1− (1− x) ·Δ)RD) because with probability 1−p
the bank makes negative profits such that the banker receives zero. This leads
to the first order condition for the optimal portfolio choice variable x of
∂E(U reg)
∂x
= Δ+
1
ρ
· p [(1−Δ)R−RL(x) + (1− x)R′L(x)] != 0 (9)
Solving for the optimal portfolio investment gives the optimal investment
in risky assets as a function of the regulation Δ:
(1− xˆ(Δ)) = B −
Δρ
p
− (1−Δ)R
2d
(10)
It is straightforward to show that the investment choice of the representative
bank into safe assets is increasing in the risk weight for risky assets: Note,
14Corresponding to the discussion above, Δ reflects the difference of risky and safe risk
weights times the general capital requirement, i.e, (wL − wS)δ. The risk weight wL for a
corporate may be above 100% , e.g. claims on corporations are assigned with a risk weight
of up to 150% under the Standard Approach when the corporation rated below BB−.
However, even with a zero risk weight wS = 0 the difference (wL − wS) is multiplied by
the general capital requirement δ, i.e., 8% under Basel II and up to 13 % under Basel
III such that even under the higher requirements of Basel III it is feasible to assume that
Δ < 1.
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that if the banker is not allowed to receive funds from depositors but has to
refund his investment with equity only, i.e., Δ = 1, the optimal investment
of the regulated banker would be lower than the first best investment, due
to the high opportunity cost of equity investment. In the other extreme
case, when Δ = 0 the banker’s investment choice equals equation (7), the
unregulated case.
Moreover, the partial derivative of the optimal safe investment choice
with respect to the capital requirement regulation is positive:
∂xˆ(Δ)
∂Δ
=
1
2
ρ− pR
pd
> 0 (11)
A higher risk weight for loan assets reduces investment in risky assets and
increases investment in government bonds.
3.4. The Optimal Risk Weight of a Regulator without Fiscal Interest
Under the assumption that the regulator cannot regulate the asset side
of the bank but only the liability side, the first best outcome cannot be
implemented.15 However, the regulator can force the bankers to internalize
the cost of their excessive risk taking with the help of minimum capital
requirement. The regulator thereby takes the investment decision xˆ(Δ) of
bankers as given. To force the banker to internalize the full cost of his
investment decision the regulator sets a Δ∗ such that the regulated banker
15Actually, regulation under the Basel accords concentrates on liabilities of the bank
rather than the regulation of assets: The main reason for this focus is the asymmetric
information on the asset characteristics. As banks are specialized in evaluating the risk
and return characteristics of their assets it is difficult, if not impossible, for a regulator
to determine the optimal asset portfolio composition. However, anticipating that the
incentives of bankers are disturbed by their limited liability, the regulator can correct
these incentives by requiring the banker to invest sufficient equity funds.
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implements xˆ(Δ∗) = x∗. Formally, he sets Δ∗ = argmax{E(U fl(x(Δ))} such
that the Δ∗ chosen fulfill the first order condition of the fully liable banker
with reaction function xˆ(Δ).
Proposition 1. The regulator without fiscal interest sets an optimal capital
requirement risk weight for loan assets that balances the banker’s benefit from
limited liability with the private opportunity costs of investing equity
Δ∗ =
R · (1− p)
ρ− pR .
Proof. The first order condition is
p(R− B + 2d(1− x(Δ)) + (1− p)R != 0.
Using equation (10) and solving for Δ yields the Δ∗ for which it is true that
1− xˆ(Δ∗) = 1− x∗, i.e.:
(1− xˆ(Δ∗)) = B −
Δρ
p
− (1−Δ)R
2d
=
pB − pR−Δ(ρ− pR)
2dp
Inserting Δ∗ = R·(1−p)
ρ−pR and using Lemma 2 yields:
pB − pR−R(1− p)
2dp
=
B − R
p
2d
= (1− x∗)
It is worth noting that the optimal capital requirement risk weight, and
hence the demand for safe assets, is increasing in the risk less government
bond rate R.
3.5. A Regulator with Fiscal Interests
This section analyzes how a regulator sets the capital requirement when
he also has fiscal interests. In other words, I assume that the regulator gains
some utility from forcing banks to integrate the negative externality of their
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investment. However, the regulator also gains utility from maximizing his
current budget and, thus, wants banks and households to invest in govern-
ment bonds. I focus on a short term oriented regulator that only values
current consumption in t = 1. In particular, I assume that, besides regu-
lating the banking sector, the government regulator wants to maximize his
budget in t = 1.16
Requiring banks to refund their investments with inside equity in this
model has two effects on: Firstly, the bank internalizes the risk and, therefore,
invests less in loan assets compared to the unregulated decision. Secondly, the
inside equity crowds out deposit investments of households. Since households
have access to the sovereign debt market, those households that can not
deposit their savings at a bank invest their savings in government bonds.
A regulator with fiscal interests then wants to maximize the weighted
sum of utility he gets from setting Δ∗ and the utility from his current budget
xˆ(Δ) + (1 − xˆ(Δ))Δ. The current budget consists of two terms, where the
first term is the direct investment in government bonds from banks as a
function of capital regulation and the second term the increased investment
from households that cannot deposit their savings at banks due to the capital
requirement. Both terms are increasing in the capital requirement, though
the second term at a decreasing rate, since banks invest less in risky loans
to minimize their private cost of capital requirements. Denote with Γ(Δ, φ)
16The weight that a government regulator puts on budget maximization can also be
interpreted as a measure for the necessity to raise new debt in order to server outstanding
debt. This is not explicitly modeled in this simple static model, but the intuition would be,
that a government with high outstanding debt from earlier periods would have a greater
interest to maximize its budget than a government that has low outstanding debt.
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the utility of a regulator with fiscal interest, where the government regulator
weights the goal of current budget maximization with φ and the achievement
on his goal of optimal regulation with (1− φ).
Δˆ(φ) = argmax{(1− φ)E(U fl(x(Δ)) + φ [xˆ+ (1− xˆ) ·Δ]} (12)
If φ = 0, the regulator has no fiscal interest and sets the optimal capital
requirement, i.e., Δˆ(0) = Δ∗. However, if φ > 0, the government regulator
sets a capital requirement strictly greater than the optimal regulation.
Proposition 2. A regulator with fiscal interests sets a higher relative risk
weighted capital requirement on risky loan assets than a regulator without
fiscal interests.
Proof. The first order condition can be solved for Delta:
Δ =
p (1− φ) (1− p)R2 + (((2− ρ)φ+ ρ)− ρ (1− φ))R− φ (ρ+ pB)
(ρ− pR) (p (1− φ)R + (ρ− 2)φ− ρ)
The second partial derivative with respect to Δ is negative:
−1
2
(1− φ) (ρ− pR)2
pd
− φ (ρ− pR)
pd
< 0
The partial derivative of the optimal regulation with respect to φ is positive:
∂Δ
∂φ
=
pB −R + ρ−R
((1− φ) ρ− p (1− φ)R + 2φ)2 > 0
Here the basic assumptions are used, i.e. that pB > ρ and ρ ≥ R. The higher
φ, i.e., the more interested the regulator is in current budget maximization,
the higher he sets the relative risk weighted capital requirement for risky loan
assets.
To get an intuition, consider the case where φ = 1, the case of a Leviathan
regulator that is only interested in maximizing his budget in t = 1. In this
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case, the first order condition can be summarized to the following condition:
Δ = min
[
1
2
(
1 +
p(B −R)
ρ− pR
)
, 1
]
= 1
For the basic assumptions pB > ρ and ρ > R, the first term is strictly greater
than one, such that a Leviathan regulator would always choose the corner
solution and sets the relative risk weighted capital requirement for risky loans
equal to one.
In contrast, a regulator without fiscal interest sets a capital requirement
strictly smaller than one, i.e. Δ∗ < 1 for ρ > R.
Moreover, as shown in the proof of Proposition 2, the capital requirement
set by the regulator is strictly increasing in his fiscal interest φ, when the
expected return from loan investment outweighs the banker’s private cost of
capital. The more a regulator is fiscally interested, i.e, the more he values
current budget maximization (higher φ), the higher he sets the relative risk
weight for loan assets, deviating from the optimal risk weight, i.e.: ∂Δ(φ,R)
∂φ
>
0. Thereby, the regulator channels funds from bankers and households to
investments in government bonds.
Figure 2 illustrates three different types of the government regulator. The
thin black line, labeled (a), depicts the regulator’s utility without any fiscal
interest. He will set the risk weight for risky loan assets as described in
Proposition 1. The thin grey line, labeled (b), illustrates the case of a partly
fiscally interested regulator. The maximum of his utility function is reached
at a higher relative risk weight for risky loan assets. The bold black line,
labeled (c), depicts the utility of a regulator that is only concerned with
fiscal interests, i.e., that only derives utility from current consumption. Such
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Figure 2: The Regulator’s Utility as a function of Δ and φ
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a Leviathan optimally chooses a corner solution where he sets the risk weight
as high as possible, which would be equal to full inside equity funding in our
model framework. The dashed grey line depicts all feasible utility maximizing
Δ(φ) for φ ∈ [0, 1]. A higher regulator’s interest results in a higher overall
utility level because in this simple setting the budget maximization adds
utility to the utility gained from optimal regulation.
Basically, the regulator can implement any bank investment portfolio
decision in the interval [xˆ(0), xˆ(1)]by setting a certain Δ. In other words, the
risk weight decision directly influences how much the banking sector invests
in safe assets xˆ. It is easy to verify that x(Δ(0)) < x(Δ(φ)) for Δ(φ) > Δ(0),
because x is linearly increasing in Δ. The benevolent regulator channels less
funds into government bonds than the regulator with fiscal interests.
4. Welfare Considerations
The goal of optimal regulation to internalize the cost of risk shifting to
the bank’s optimal portfolio choice does not necessarily coincide with the
welfare maximizing regulation of the banking sector. In particular, with
no additional social cost of bank default, the regulation of banks in this
simple model would be welfare decreasing. To see this, consider the welfare
generated in terms of consumption.
In t = 1, the endowment of households is invested in banks and gov-
ernment bonds depending on the regulation. Banks consume W − K and
the government consumes K. The net welfare effect is zero, since higher
regulation just shifts consumption from banks to the government regulator.
In t = 2, the productive return from the risky projects ΠF (1 − xˆ(Δ))
is generated and split between the banks and the firms in terms of the loan
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interest rate. The residual profit of borrowers is shared between the successful
entrepreneurs and the government according to the tax rate. Households
receive and consume R, either from successful banks or the government in
case of bank default. The government pays back its obligations to banks
and households. Hence, the net welfare Y generated is the net profit from
successful entrepreneurs Y = (1− x(Δ)) · p(B − d
2
(1− x(Δ))).
Without any social cost of bank default, the net impact of investment
in government bonds is a reduction in welfare. In particular, the capital
regulation that maximizes the net profit from successful entrepreneurs is:
ΔY = argmax(1− xˆ(Δ)) · p(B − d
2
(1− xˆ(Δ))) = −p(B +R)
ρ− pR < 0 (13)
Therefore, any capital regulation Δ > 0 reduces welfare, because it reduces
investment into the productive but risky sector. However, as the recent finan-
cial crisis has illustrated, bank failures are costly because of the contagion to
other solvent banks, the disappearance of know how and private information
on borrowers, as well as the disturbance of trust, financing, and payment
flows. I assume that these costs are linear to the bank failure, though as
the last crisis has shown, the costs could very well be convex, i.e. the more
banks fail the higher are the marginal costs to society. Introducing these
social costs s proportional to the banks that default, the welfare function
can be written as
Y = (1− x(Δ)) · p(B − d
2
(1− x(Δ))− s(1− p) · (1− x(Δ)) (14)
Proposition 3. With moderate social cost of bank default, a fiscally inter-
ested capital regulation harms social welfare.
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The detailed proof can be found in the Appendix A. The intuition
is that, with moderate social cost associated with bank default, i.e. s ∈[
0, 1
2
(
B+R
1−p +R
)]
, setting a capital regulation Δ(φ) > Δ∗ strictly reduces
welfare. However, if the social costs are very high, i.e. s > 1
2
(
B+R
1−p +R
)
welfare can be increased by fiscally interested regulation. However, a regu-
lator with high fiscal interest may not consider the constraint of government
solvency and, therefore, may risk the detrimental welfare consequences of a
sovereign default.
5. Discussion
The paper argues that a government regulator, who simultaneously reg-
ulates the banking sector and borrows from it, may have the incentive to
increase risk weights for risky loan assets beyond the optimal level in order
to ease its own debt financing. In particular, the government regulator may
have an incentive to overregulate risky assets compared to safe assets. This
incentive to overregulate is particularly interesting, since the most prominent
international guidelines for prudential capital regulation, the Basel accords,
only provide standards for minimum capital requirements but not for maxi-
mum requirements. Therefore, the Basel agreements leave room to overreg-
ulate classes of assets compared to less risky assets. By overregulating the
risky assets, the government regulator can indirectly increase the demand
for government bonds, thereby undermining the separation of monetary and
fiscal policy.
Likewise, biased risk weighted capital regulation may be implemented in
the form of underregulated safe assets compared to risky assets. If risky as-
sets receive a fair risk weight that indeed reflects the fundamental risk of the
31
asset, the government with fiscal interest may have an incentive to relatively
underregulated the government bond compared to the risky asset. Anecdotal
evidence may be found in the implementation of the Basel II agreement into
European law. Deviating from the recommendations of Basel II, the Cap-
ital Requirement Directive imposed a zero-risk weight on all EU sovereign
bonds. Arguably this lowest possible risk weight encouraged European banks
to invest massively in these EU bonds because irrespective of the individual
sovereign risk, the bank could invest without any additional equity require-
ment. In times of low interest rates but rare equity, the cheap borrowed
capital was, therefore, channeled into EU government bonds.
In each of the two theoretical cases, biased capital ratios increase the
demand for government bonds. This eases government spending and thus
circumvents the monetary policy monopoly of an independent institution as
the central bank. In other words, through risk weighted capital regulations,
governments can indirectly influence their refunding conditions. Moreover,
reduced cost of government debt may increase government spending. The in-
crease in current government debt may jeopardize the government’s solvency
of tomorrow. However, if the yield on government bonds does not (fully) re-
flect the riskiness of the government regulator, this higher risk is not (fully)
taken into account by the regulator with fiscal interests. This result points
to an additional problem in the Eurozone, where government bond yields
did not fully reflect the individual risk of each Eurozone member state. Be-
sides the direct incentive to increase government debt due to cheap financing,
the government regulator has the incentive to introduce biased regulation,
thereby forcing banks to increase their investments in government bonds.
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This could lead to an additional problem. Due to the excessive investment
in government bonds, all banks are more correlated. If the government bonds
can default, the systemic risk in the banking sector increases. If the financial
distress of the regulator results in a systemic crisis of the banking sector,
the feedback effect on the government through the safety net can drive the
government and its banking sector into an insolvency circle.
The policy implications of the presented analysis are threefold: In the
aftermath of the financial crisis, the reformers in the Basel Committee focused
on the size and quality of the regulatory equity. In addition, anticyclical
equity buffers are introduced. However, the calibration of the risk weights
barely changed and the standards of implementation and supervision are no
component of the reforms. This focus on the fine-tuning of the risk weighted
capital regulation overlooks incentive problems regarding the national and
supranational implementation of the Basel Accords. The problem of upwards
biased capital adequacy regulation may be encountered by a simple maximum
leverage ratio as discussed in the Basel III reform.
Moreover, the analysis suggests the equity regulation should be delegated
to an independent authority because it has the power to indirectly influence
monetary policy. For example, the delegation of regulatory policy, especially
the imposition of risk weights, to an independent institution like the cen-
tral bank could avoid the inherent conflict of interest. Finally, the analysis
suggests that higher indebted governments have a higher incentive to bias
capital regulation. In the process of international harmonization of banking
regulation, the harmonization of maximum government debt levels may also
alleviate the adverse incentives of governments to bias the regulation.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. In t = 1, banks consume
W −K
Households invest
−W
The government consumes
x+K
and borrowers receive
1− x
The net welfare is
W −K −W + x+K + 1− x = 1.
In t = 2, banks consume
p(xR + (1− x)RL − (1−K)R)
Households receive p(1 − K)R from successful banks and (1 − p)(1 − K)R
from the government, taking over the liabilities from defaulting banks
p(1−K)R + (1− p)(1−K)R +KR = R
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The government receives tax income and pays pxr to banks or depositors in
case of default, pays (1− p)(1−K)R−KR
τ · p(1− x)(B −RL − d
2
(1− x))− pxR− (1− p)(1−K)R
and borrowers receive
(1− τ) · p(1− x)(B −RL − d
2
(1− x))
The intertemporal net welfareis
Y := 1 + p(1− xˆ(Δ))(B − d
2
(1− xˆ(Δ))).
Using equation (10) the net welfare can be expressed in terms of the capital
requirement:
1 +
(
1
2
B (p(B −R)−Δ(ρ− pR))
pd
− 1
8
(p(B −R)−Δ(ρ− pR))2
dp2
)
p
The first order condition with respect to Δ is
−1
4
(p(B −R)−Δ(ρ− pR)) (ρ− pR)
dp2
p
!
=
1
2
B (ρ− pR)
pd
Solving for delta gives:
ΔW = −pB + pR
ρ− pR < 0
Introducing the social cost of bank default, the social welfare function be-
comes
Y s := 1 + p(1− x)(B − d
2
(1− x))− s(1− p)(1− x)
Solving the first order condition for Δ gives:
ΔW (s) =
2(1− p)s− p (B +R)
ρ− pR
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The welfare optimal ΔW (s) is between 0 and 1 for s ∈
[
B+R
2(1−p) ,
(ρ−pR)+(B+R)
2(1−p)
]
.
For s = (ρ−pR)+R(1−p)
2(1−p) , the welfare optimal Δ equals the benevolent regulator’s
choice. Therefore, for s ≤ (ρ−pR)+R(1−p)
2(1−p) , the welfare is decreasing if the
regulator has fiscal interests and sets a risk weighted capital regulation that
is higher than the regulation that internalizes the risk shifting of limitedly
liable banks.
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